T his paper has for its object the investigation of the general analytical conditions of a Method for the solution of Questions in the Theory of Probabilities, which was proposed by me in a work entitled " An Investigation of the Laws of Thought" (London, Walton and Maberly, 1854).
properties in the actual urn is the same as it is conceived to be in the ideal urn of free balls, but the hypothesis that it is so, involves an equal distribution of our actual knowledge, and enables us to construct the problem from ultimate hypotheses which reduce it to a calculation of combinations.
I pass from the particular and material to the general problem. In the form to which this is brought by the Calculus of Logic, the probabilities are those of events of which certain combinations are, as a logical consequence of the original definitions of those events, impossible. It might, at first sight, appear that this establishes a fundamental difference between this problem and that of the urn, in which certain combinations are prevented from issuing by a material hindrance. In the one case the restriction appears as logically necessary, in the other as only actual.
Upon this I remark, that the data of the problem in its ultimate reduced form might result from the same kind of dependence as in the actual data; that they, in fact, would thus result if the mind of the observer were capable of contemplating, and were in a position to contemplate, each of the events in this ultimate translated form simply as a whole, and of recording, through an approximately infinite series of observations, what combinations of those wholes come into being, and what do not, in the actual universe.
What appears as necessary in the translated data would now appear as actual-as a result of observation; what is impossible would be received as non-existent. The ques tion is, then, whether the difference between the conception of what is impossible from involving a logical contradiction, and the conception of what in the actual constitution
of things never exists, is of a kind to affect expectation. I do not hesitate to say that it is not. W e are concerned with events in so far as they are capable of happening or not happening, of combining or not combining; but wT e are not concerned with the reasons in virtue of w'hich they happen or do not happen, combine or do not combine. I f we went beyond this, we should enter upon a metaphysical question to which I presume that no answer can, upon rational grounds, be given, viz. upon the question whether, when two things or events are in the actual constitution of things incapable of happen ing together, it would, if our knowledge were sufficiently extended, be found that the resulting conceptions of them were logically inconsistent.
I have but one further observation on Principle II. to make. It is that in the general problem we are not called upon to interpret the ideal events. The whole procedure is, like every other procedure of abstract thought, formal. W e do not say that the ideal events exist, but that the events in the translated form of the actual problem are to be considered to have such relations with respect to happening or not happening as a certain system of ideal events would have if conceived first as free, and then subjected, without their freedom being otherwise affected, to relations formally agreeing with those to which the events in the translated problem are subject.
tion through arbitrary hypotheses, coupled with the assumption that any result thus obtained is necessarily the true one. The application of the principle employed in the text, and founded upon the general theorem of development in Logic, I hold to be not arbitrary.
We are now able to explain more clearly the nature of the analytical investigation which will follow. Let p 2, represent the probabilities given in the data. As these will in general not be the probabilities of unconnected events, they will be subject to other conditions than that of being positive proper fractions, viz. to other conditions beside Those other conditions will, as will hereafter be shown, be capable of expression by equations or inequations reducible to the general form #2, . . . an, a being numerical constants which differ for the different conditions in question. These, together with the former, may be termed the conditions of possible experience. When satisfied they indicate that the data have, when not satisfied they indicate that the data cannot have, resulted from actual observation. On the other hand, the ideal events are regarded as independent, and their probabilities, which enter as auxiliary quantities into the process of solution, are subject to no other condition than that of being positive proper fractions. It is the general object of the analytical investigation to establish the two following conclusions, viz.,-1st. The probabilities of the ideal independent events, as involved in the method under consideration, will in the process be determinable, without ambiguity, as positive proper fractions whenever the data satisfy the conditions of possible experience, and not otherwise.
And, as a consequence of the above, 2ndly. The probability determined by the method will have such a value as it con sistently might have had if, instead of being calculated from the data, it had been deter mined by observation under the same experience as the data.
These conclusions rest upon the ground of certain analytical theorems relating to functional determinants, and to the possible solutions of simultaneous algebraic equa tions, which will be demonstrated in this paper. But, in order to explain the appli cation of those theorems, it will be necessary to show, first, how the " conditions of possible experience " in problems in the Theory of Probabilities may be determined; secondly, what the analytical method in question for the solution of such problems is.
The method for determining the conditions of possible experience given in the ' Laws of Thought,' chap, xix., may be advantageously replaced by the following one, which is taken from the ' Memoir on the Combination of Testimonies and of Judgments,' already referred to.
Let the events in the data be resolved into the ultimate possible alternatives which they involve, and let the unknown probabilities of these alternatives be represented by X, v, &c.; then, as the probability of each event in the data is equal to the sum of the This method is illustrated in the following problem, in the expression and solution of which it is to be noticed, that when in the Calculus of Logic an event is represented by x, the event which consists in its not happening is denoted by 1 -#, or for brevity by x ; that when two events are represented by x and their concurrence is denoted by xy, the happening of the first without the second by and so on. Problem. Given that the probability of the concurrence of the events x and y is of the events y and z, q, and of the events z and r. Required the conditio q, and r must be subject in order that the above data may be consistent with a pos sible experience.
Resolving the events xy, y z , xz into the possible alternations o formed, let us write Prob. Suppose, for instance, it was affirmed as a result of medical statistics that, in twofifths of a number of cases of disease of a certain character, two symptoms and were observed; in two-thirds of the cases the symptoms and z were observed; and in fourfifths of the cases the symptoms z and x were observed ; so that, the number of cases observed being large, we might on a future outbreak of the disease consider the fractions | , a and f as the probabilities of recurrence of the particular combinations of the symptoms x^ y, and z observed. The above formuke would, show that the evidence wascontradictory. For, representing the respective fractions by and r, the condition is not satisfied. (Edinburgh Memoir.) In applying the above method to the a priori limitation of questions in the theory of probabilities, it will be necessary to represent the probability sought by a single letter u, and treat this as if it were one of the numerical data. The resolution of the event of which the probability is sought into alternatives belonging to the same scheme as those of the events in the data gives us a new equation, which must be combined with the equations involving p , q, r, Sec. The elimination of X, f/j, v, Sec. then d only the conditions of possible experience limiting jp, q, r, but also the conditions which u must satisfy cc priori, whatever method for its actual determination may be employed.
Thus, if from the foregoing data it were required to determine the a priori limits of Prob. xyz,i. e. of the probability of the conjunction of the events x, y, , we should have as the additional equation and therefore, after elimination of X, y», v, u% p,u<q, u^r ,
--2-------J the conditions required. It will, however, in most of the following investigations suffice to consider the con ditions of possible experience in the data alone, because it will be shown that when these are satisfied the corresponding conditions for the probability sought, when its value is determined by the method of the following section, will also be satisfied. It is proper here to observe that the conditions of possible experience can be deter mined as well from the ' translated' as from the original form of the problem. That the results will agree is evident a priori, but it may be desirable to point out the analytical connexion of the two processes. I will take the example just considered, and then offer some general remarks on the subject.
Representing the events ocy, y z , zx by s, t, v, the translated data would be f Prob.
Prob This system of equations and inequations agrees with that employed in the previous solution, if we only make
so that the elimination of X', yJ, q' will lead to the same results as before. In general it may be observed that each combination of , t, v which is possible with out logical contradiction, gives, on substituting for s, their expressions in the simple terms of the original problem, either a single combination of those simple terms, or a sum of such combinations; but the same combination of those simple terms will not arise from two different combinations of It is clear from this that the systems of united equations and inequations arising in the two forms of the problem will be related in the following manner, viz.-For each positive quantity X1 in the one set, there will exist either a single positive quantity X,or a sum of such quantities Xx-j-X2+& c. in the other; but each such sum is inseparable, and the elements it is composed of are distinct from those of any other sum arising from any other of the quantities XI t is evident, then, that th elimination will be the same. The same formal processes which eliminate single quan-tities in the one case, will eliminate the corresponding single quantities, or sums of single quantities, in the other. Now we shall proceed to show that x2, ... xn are determinable as positive quantities precisely whenp" p 2, ...p n satisfy the conditions of possible experience. W e shall further show, as a consequence of this, that the value of the probability sought, when determined by the General Hule, will, under the same conditions, lie within such limits as if it were itself given by the same experience. In the order of this proof, we shall first demon strate the theorems of pure Analysis upon which the conclusions depend, then in a distinct section make the particular application.
Simplification o f the General Equations fo r the Solution o f Questions in the

Analytical Theorems relating to Functional Determinants and Systems
. 
It is desirable to employ fixed language in referring to this. We shall therefore call the quantities An A2. ..A n the ' principal elements,' and the diagonal series of ter which they form the c principal diagonal.' The elements A^, when i and j differ, we shall call c subordinate elements.' The element Ai? together with all the subordinate elements which occur upon the same horizontal or vertical line of the determinant, we shall designate the 'e-system of elements.' Lastly, in comparing two rows or two columns of elements together, those elements will be said to correspond which occupy the same numerical place in their respective rows or columns.
The following Lemma will next be established. Lemma.-A symmetrical determinant expressed in the form (I.) will be unaltered in value, if from each subordinate element of its ^-system we subtract the corresponding element of its /-system multiplied by a quantity X, which is invariable for the same system,-and for the principal element A* substitute Af-2xA^+X2Aj.
It is known that a determinant vanishes if two of its lines or columns are iden tical, and it is known as a consequence of this that if from a particular line or column of a determinant the corresponding elements of another line or column, multiplied each by the same constant, are subtracted, the determinant is unaltered in value. From the «th line of the above symmetrical determinant subtract, term by term, X times the jth line, and then from the ith column of the resulting determinant subtract X times the jt column. As respects any subordinate element, the result will obviously accord with the statement in the Lemma. But the element A* will be successively converted into Now in the determinant thus transformed the quantity a will no longer occur in the Ji-system. This is obvious with respect to the subordinate elements of that system. With respect to the principal element, we observe that the coefficient of a is in A x, equal to a" in Ani,equal to Xaw in A", equal to X X Xo^ or X2an whence the coefficient of a in A n-2xnl+X2Aj is equal to 0. Thus a has been eliminated from the w-system, and as the process has not affected any elements but those which belong to the ^-system, it will not affect the relations under which a enters into the other systems.
Consider The above demonstration shows that the elimination of a from the %-system produces a new determinant equivalent to the original one, and in which the characters noted in the original one still remain. Should a occur in any other system or systems of elements of the new determinant beside the 1-system, it can, by repetitions of the same process, be eliminated thence. Ultimately, then, it will only remain in the 1-system, and there fore only in the principal term of that system. Again, as it enters that term in the first degree, it follows that the developed determinant will involve only the first power of a. Hence, as a may represent any of the quantities «, , <?,..., it is seen that no powers, but only products of these quantities, will appear in the developed determinant.
Let Let us compare the first column and the z-column headed with the element V*. Selecting any term in Y, suppose it to contain xt, then in whatever element of the first column that term is found, it will be found in a corresponding element of the i-column, and in each case with unity for its coefficient, since all the elements are mere collections of terms from V. But when it is not found in a particular element of the first column, it will not be found in the corresponding element* of the ^-column. The entire series of coefficients in the one being then the same as that in the other, the common ratio of the corresponding terms is unity.
Suppose, secondly, that the proposed term is found in Y and not in Vf; then in all the elements of the ^-column its coefficient is 0, so that the series of coefficients in the i-column might be formed from those in the first column by multiplying the latter successively by 0. This again represents a common ratio.
The same reasoning may be applied to the comparison of any two columns of the determinant. Thus in comparing the ^-column and the ^-column:-terms of Y which contain both x{ and X jwill be found in corresponding elements of both columns-terms which contain x{ but not X jwill be wholly absent from the ^'-column. Thus in all ca a, ux, a2, . . . un represent the coefficients of a term of Y in one column, its coefficients in any other column, taken in the same order, will be of the form Xuly Xua... Xun, the coefficient X being either 1 or 0.
Lastly, the principal elements consist, as do all the elements, of positive terms.
Therefore by the last proposition the developed determinant will consist of products (without powers higher than the first) of different terms of Y, and the coefficients of all such products will be positive.
Therefore the determinant will be expressible as a rational entire function of ...x n with positive coefficients.
The rapidity with which the complexity of the determinant increases as the number of variables increases is remarkable. increase, and on the hypothesis that the proposition to be proved is true for 1 variables, it is true for n variables.
Therefore, connecting this with the former result, the proposition is true universally.
Proposition IV.
T fV be an incomplete function, some o f the terms belonging to the complete form being wanting, but the terms present having their coefficients , it will in general be neces sary not only that the quantities p lx p 2 ,.. .p n should be positive fractions^ but also that they should satisfy certain inequations o f the form The conditions Xx < 1, &c. are already implied in (3.) or (4.). The X quantities are thus subject to a system of united equations and , from which they must be eliminated by the method already explained.
The result of such elimination will be a final system of inequations connecting Pi, Pn, . . . p n. Equations connecting these quantities can only present themselves when the equations of the original system are not independent, or, which really falls under 2 £ 2 the same hypothesis, when one or more of the variables . . . is wholly absent from that system. Thus if x x were a common factor of all t divide out from the numerators and denominators of the system, which would thus be come a system of n simultaneous equations connecting the n -1 variables x2, x". Considered with reference to these variables, therefore, the equations of the system would not he independent.
All resulting inequations will be capable of expression under the one general form, the second member of which is an inferior limit of ; and it will be observed that the calculated value of this member may be positive, as there is no general restriction on the signs of a2, . i . an, b. In the latter case, changing ax into -«i, and observing t the second member of which is a superior limit of Lastly, the final system of inequations, is totally independent of the numerical value of the coefficients of V. The only restriction is that these coefficients are positive. an equation by which we may replace any one of the .equations of the system (1.), and
Hence since #, = Q and yt is finite and positive for all values of i from 2 to n, we se x wip be 0 for all values of i for which at is positive, finite and positive for all values of i for which is 0, and infinite for all values of i for which at is negative.
Case 2; the coefficient negative. Here the inequation of condition (3.) must be supposed to determine the lowest of the superior limits of <pi, and therefore when coincides with that limit we have The transformations remaining formally the same as before, the following results will present themselves.
The terms in H and in H 2, H3... H n will be affected with negative instead of positive powers of xy Hence the same determination of . from the last n-1 equa tions of (6.), which before followed from the assumption will now follow from the assumption x x= oo, which at the same time satisfies the first equation of (6.).
The equation ft --shows, since ax is here negative and x x infinite, that will he infinite for those values of i for which a{ is negative, finite for those values of i for which is 0, nothing for those values of i for which at is positive.
In all these cases the values 0 and oo appear as limits of finite positive values. This results from the connexion of the second member of the first equation of the system (6.) with the condition (3.).
Lastly, as the incompleteness of form of V only causes certain terms of the developed determinant of Proposition II. to vanish, but leaves the signs of the terms which remain positive, it follows that as x x varies from 0 to infinity, x2, being always determined by the last n -1 equations of (1.), the function ^-r will vary by continuous increase be tween the limits above investigated, viz. from the highest inferior to the lowest superior limit of Once, therefore, in its progress it becomes equal to y>n and all the equations are satisfied together.
The above reasoning establishes rigorously that if the proposition is true for n 1 variables, it is true for n variables. It remains then to consider the limiting case of n = 1.
Here Again, as the process for determining the a priori limits of the probability sought rests ultimately upon the assumption that the ratio of any term or partial aggregate of terms in V to V itself is a positive fraction, and as this assumption is satisfied when Xu x2 . . . xn are positive quantities, it follows that the calculated value of the probability sought will always lie within the limits which it would have had if determined by observation from the same experience as the data.
But though the test last mentioned is one which must necessarily be satisfied by a true method, it is of infinitely less theoretical importance than that from which it is derived, viz. the test which consists in the absolute connexion between possibility in the data and formal consistency in the method.
As the conclusions of Propositions IV. and V. depend upon the form of the function V and the fact that its coefficients are positive, it follows that if in the application of the method to questions of probability we substituted any other positive values for unity in the coefficients of V, leaving the rest of the process as before, we should still be able to determine x u x2i... xn as positive quantities, or as limits of such, and the altered the probability sought would still be consistent with the experience from which the data are supposed to be derived. It would, however, properly speaking, be a value of inter polation, not a probability.
I will close with a few remarks upon the general nature of the method, and of the solutions to which it leads.
